PROBLEM: Unauthorized access is usually discovered late, because the intruder touches real data first and the alarm comes after the damage. A canary is a decoy file that no legitimate workflow ever opens — a contact sheet that says plainly it is bait, and a payout-accounts file that is not real data — so any read or change to it means someone went looking where they should not. Our two canaries verified clean on Nov 10, 2026, but the check is manual, so a canary could trip and sit unnoticed between checks.
SOLUTION: A canary-tripwire unauthorized-access record: every canary file logged with its hash, its expected content, and its check schedule, with any hash change or unexpected access recorded as its own event — so an unauthorized look is caught at the decoy, before real data is touched.
EVIDENCE BASIS: DOCUMENTED — Canary files planted Oct 16, 2026 (canary-contact-sheet.txt, royalty-payout-accounts.txt decoy). SHA-256 check Nov 10, 2026: 2 of 2 OK. Sources: ~/workspace/goals/personal-security-shield/hidden_files/tripwires/manifest.sha256 and the canary files (own records).
| Idea priority | Low |
| Needed By | Not sure -- Just thought it was cool |
By clicking the "Post Comment" or "Submit Idea" button, you are agreeing to the IBM Ideas Portal Terms of Use.
Do not place IBM confidential, company confidential, or personal information into any field.