Skip to Main Content
Status Submitted
Workspace * IBM Cloud Ideas
Categories Compliance
Created by Guest
Created on Nov 19, 2026

Canary-Tripwire Unauthorized-Access Record

PROBLEM: Unauthorized access is usually discovered late, because the intruder touches real data first and the alarm comes after the damage. A canary is a decoy file that no legitimate workflow ever opens — a contact sheet that says plainly it is bait, and a payout-accounts file that is not real data — so any read or change to it means someone went looking where they should not. Our two canaries verified clean on Nov 10, 2026, but the check is manual, so a canary could trip and sit unnoticed between checks.

SOLUTION: A canary-tripwire unauthorized-access record: every canary file logged with its hash, its expected content, and its check schedule, with any hash change or unexpected access recorded as its own event — so an unauthorized look is caught at the decoy, before real data is touched.

EVIDENCE BASIS: DOCUMENTED — Canary files planted Oct 16, 2026 (canary-contact-sheet.txt, royalty-payout-accounts.txt decoy). SHA-256 check Nov 10, 2026: 2 of 2 OK. Sources: ~/workspace/goals/personal-security-shield/hidden_files/tripwires/manifest.sha256 and the canary files (own records).

Idea priority Low
Needed By Not sure -- Just thought it was cool