PROBLEM: Implantable cardiac devices receive firmware updates and exchange telemetry over wireless links, but there is no standard ledger recording firmware versions, update provenance, and telemetry-session integrity for each device.
SOLUTION: A security ledger per device: firmware version history, update source and verification, telemetry session logs, and anomaly flags, so any unexpected firmware or telemetry event can be traced and audited.
EVIDENCE BASIS: DOCUMENTED — implanted cardiac devices use RF wireless telemetry (FDA wireless medical devices guidance); firmware and telemetry integrity are part of the FDA-recognized risk-management framework (IEC 80001-1). Research note D3.
| Idea priority | Low |
| Needed By | Not sure -- Just thought it was cool |
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