PROBLEM: When a government demands access to end-to-end encrypted data, the public debate turns on whether the demand requires a "backdoor" — a hidden access mechanism that weakens encryption for everyone. The provider in the November 2026 case stated publicly that it has never built a backdoor or master key to any of its products or services and never will. But no standard record exists that lets a provider document, in a verifiable way, what access capabilities it has and has not built, so the public must rely on a statement alone.
SOLUTION: An encryption-backdoor risk record for providers: a published, independently auditable record in which a provider states, for each product, the key-custody model (user-held, provider-held, or shared), the access capabilities built in response to lawful demands, and the capabilities it has refused to build, with the audit method stated. The record is updated on any change and retained as a dated history.
EVIDENCE BASIS: DOCUMENTED — the provider's public statement: "we have never built a backdoor or master key to any of our products or services and we never will." UNVERIFIED — whether any access capability was in fact built or used under any notice, because the notices are secret and their contents undisclosed; the draft asserts no such finding. The proposed record is an inventor concept.
| Idea priority | Low |
| Needed By | Not sure -- Just thought it was cool |
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